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THE INFORMAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF BOOMERANG 
CHILDREN IN THE HOME 
SHELLY KREICZER-LEVY* 
ABSTRACT 
 Adult children living with their parents represent an increas-
ingly common social phenomenon in the United States that chal-
lenges the boundaries of both the family and formal property 
rights.  What is the legal status of adult children living with their 
parents?  Do parents have any additional duties when they re-
scind permission for their child to live with them?  Property and 
family scholars have not addressed this important issue.  This Ar-
ticle fills the void.  Instead of treating people who live together as 
strangers, owing no legal obligations to one another, I argue that 
under certain conditions living with others creates a property 
community in the home.  I call this community “home-sharing.”  
Conceptualizing living with others as a property community al-
lows us to legally recognize the deep commitment between people 
who share a home.  I urge scholars to reconsider the rule that al-
lows an owner to unilaterally revoke permission to live in the 
home, and I argue that eviction law should stipulate additional 
responsibilities when the owner seeks to evict a cohabitee.  I do 
not claim that the child should continue to live at home, but argue 
for remedies that recognize the child’s voice, for example, a duty 
to explain and justify the decision, to listen to the child’s argu-
ments, and to respect a predetermined cooling-off period. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 2006 romantic comedy Failure to Launch, a thirty-five-year-old 
man who lives with his parents shows no intention of ever leaving home.  
His parents are frustrated by the situation but do not want to confront their 
child.  Instead, they hire a female expert to become romantically involved 
with him and encourage him to move out.  As this type of movie might lead 
one to expect, the happy ending arrives when the expert and the son fall in 
love and redeem each other’s weaknesses.  The banalities of the story aside, 
the movie attempts to tell the tale of a generation of late home-leavers and 
boomerang children.  It fits well with a popular culture preoccupied with, 
and media frenzy over, adult children living with their parents.1  This rela-
                                                          
 1.  See, e.g., LINDA PERLMAN GORDON & SUSAN MORRIS SHAFFER, MOM, CAN I MOVE 
BACK IN WITH YOU?: A SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR PARENTS OF TWENTYSOMETHINGS (2004); Nancy 
Anderson, Boomerang Children Living at Home May Not Be Such a Bad Thing, FORBES (Aug. 16, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/financialfinesse/2012/08/16/boomerang-children-living-at-
home-may-not-be-such-a-bad-thing/; Ann Brenoff, Boomerang Kids: 5 Things You Should Stop 
Doing for Your Adult Children, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/26/boomerang-kids-5-things-you-should-stop-
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tively recent residential pattern raises new questions.  What is the legal sta-
tus of adult children living with their parents in terms of property rights?  
Do parents have any additional duties when they rescind permission for 
their child to live with them? 
Contrary to the phenomena of cohabiting couples or minor children 
living with their parents, which are both frequently discussed in the litera-
ture, this type of living arrangement has received little consideration from 
legal scholars.2  This is a surprising fact considering the numbers that clear-
ly show it has become an increasingly frequent pattern in the United States 
and worldwide.3  A recent Pew research report found that in 2012 thirty-six 
percent of America’s young adults ages eighteen to thirty-one were living 
with their parents, a record number of 21.6 million young adults,4 which re-
flects a steady increase from thirty-two percent in 2007.5 
Formal property rights lead to the inevitable conclusion that adult chil-
dren live at home at the mercy of the home’s owners, who happen to be 
their parents.6  Similarly, according to the basic premise of family law, par-
ents are under no obligation to provide for their adult independent children.7  
                                                          
doing_n_3133244.html; Bye Bye Boomerangs: How to Persuade Your Adult Offspring to Move 
out, ECONOMIST (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21583712-how-
persuade-your-adult-offspring-move-out-bye-bye-boomerangs; Jim Reed, “Boomerang” Genera-
tion Back Home, BBC NEWSBEAT (May 20, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/hi/the_p_word/newsid_8057000/8057167.stm.  For movies, see 
LONESOME JIM (IFC Films 2005) and JEFF WHO LIVES AT HOME (Paramount Vantage 2011).  
 2.  For cohabiting couples see Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The 
Case of Heterosexual Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1 (2009); see also Shahar Lifshitz, The 
External Rights of Cohabiting Couples in Israel, 37 ISR. L. REV. 346 (2003); Eric P. Voigt, Note, 
Reconsidering the Mythical Advantages of Cohabitation: Why Marriage Is More Efficient Than 
Cohabitation, 78 IND. L.J. 1069 (2003).  For cohabitation of minor children and their parents, see 
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: Towards a Differ-
entiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419 (2013); see also Part I.A.  
For an exception, see Hilary B. Farber, A Parent’s “Apparent” Authority: Why Intergenerational 
Coresidence Requires a Reassessment of Parental Consent to Search Adult Children’s Bedrooms 
21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (2011). 
 3.  See infra notes 123–128 and accompanying text. 
 4.  RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CTR., A RISING SHARE OF YOUNG ADULTS LIVE IN 
THEIR PARENTS’ HOME 3 (2013). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  In his influential work on the household, Robert Ellickson describes the home based on 
current property and contract law as “[h]ouseholds at-will.”  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the 
Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 240–42 (2006) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  According to this vision, each co-occupant can leave the home 
whenever she pleases, and the owner can exclude other (non-owner) co-occupants from the home.  
Ellickson further argues that the principle of private property and freedom of exit support this 
conclusion.  See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE 
HEARTH 17–21 (2008); supra Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights 
Around the Hearth, at 240–42.  For a more detailed account of his argument see infra text accom-
panying note 60. 
 7.  Cf. Anna Stepien-Sporek and Margaret Ryznar, Child Support for Adult Children, 30 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 359, 364 (2012). 
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This rather common analysis is flawed because it treats people who live to-
gether as strangers, owing no legal obligations to one another.  Even though 
there are a number of legal rules that attribute meaning to the fact that peo-
ple live or have lived together in shaping and defining familial obligations,8 
there is no one clear dictum that justifies these rules.  This Article fills this 
void in property and family law by providing such a justification.  More 
concretely, it seeks to articulate the property implications of living with 
others.  In particular, it maintains that eviction law should stipulate addi-
tional responsibilities when the owner seeks to evict a cohabitee.  The test 
case for this argument is parents who seek to evict their adult children. 
I argue that, under certain conditions, living with others creates a prop-
erty community (a “home-sharing community”).  A home-sharing commu-
nity focuses on the relational aspects of living with others and the commu-
nal creation of the home9 by all the co-occupants.  The claim is that an 
owner (in this case the parent) cannot unilaterally decide to rescind permis-
sion to live in the home.10  Instead, I argue that when a home-sharing com-
munity exists, parents are required to recognize the child’s voice in the pro-
cess of ending the community in the home.  Thus, for example, they might 
have a duty to explain and justify the decision or to listen to the child’s ar-
guments, and the child may be entitled to the determination of a cooling-off 
period.  When parents fail to adhere to these requirements and an eviction 
action is sought, the court must treat this type of eviction differently and 
award, in certain conditions discussed in Part V, remedies of voice. 
The argument has three broader implications.  First, it emphasizes the 
important role of sharing in property relations.  Sharing occurs when parties 
join forces to engage in a collaborative property-centered project even when 
only one of the parties is the property owner.  Indeed, this significant aspect 
of property law cannot be fully appreciated if one were to focus on owner-
ship alone.11  Second, the argument looks to expand the set of available 
remedies in property disputes.  Remedies of voice focus on property gov-
ernance,12 the internal workings of property interactions, rather than simply 
on exclusion.  Third, the argument supports a progressive vision of the fam-
ily.  Because it focuses on the home and relationships in it, and not on any 
preexisting definition of a family, the argument challenges assumptions and 
preconceptions about family formation.  It allows us to think of the home 
not just as a locus for the nuclear family but also as a site for other mean-
                                                          
 8.  See infra Part I. 
 9.  I mean home, as opposed to a house. 
 10.  JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 773–74 (7th ed. 2010) (discussing permission to 
enter land as license and its revocability). 
 11.  For the progressive property movement that rejects the exclusionary model of property 
rights see Alexander et al., infra note 47. 
 12.  For property governance see Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1853 (2012). 
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ingful relationships, including intergenerational relations and nonconjugal 
associations. 
This Article begins with a brief review of the various ways in which 
the law attributes legal meaning to cohabitation.  Part I ends with the con-
clusion that although living with others is a meaningful experience en-
dorsed by the law, the law lacks a consistent explanation to support such an 
endorsement.  The remainder of the Article defines and explains the value 
of living with others and its implications for property law, in particular 
eviction law.  Part II constructs the underlying values that co-residence 
promotes.  It touches on the benefits and perils of sharing a home, and in-
troduces the concept of a home-sharing community.  Part III distinguishes 
between different categories of co-residence.  It discusses the different legal 
rules that apply or should apply in each category.  After the broader frame-
work has been laid out, the Article moves on to discuss the particular con-
text of adult children living with their parents.  Part IV reviews the socio-
logical research of this residential pattern, including the reasons for it, 
concerns, and long-term effects.  These empirical works provide valuable 
data that lay the foundation for the legal structure outlined in Part V.  As 
this Part demonstrates, the phenomenon of adult children living with their 
parents is by no means monolithic.  Some children are deadbeats; others 
maintain a good relationship with their parents, pay bills, and contribute to 
the household; and yet others provide care for a disabled or elderly parent.  
Different cases deserve different legal treatment.  Part VI responds to im-
portant objections and challenges to the concept of a home-sharing commu-
nity as well as the particulars of the suggestions.  Part VII concludes. 
I.  FAMILIAL RELATIONS AND CO-RESIDENCE 
There is an intricate relationship between the family and the home.  
The law attributes meaning to the fact that people live or have lived togeth-
er in shaping and defining familial responsibilities.  There is no one clear 
dictum that explains when cohabiting with others generates obligations.  
Rather, there is a cluster of rules in different areas of the law that attribute 
various meanings to shared living arrangements.  When scholars criticize 
the law’s obsession with the home, they are usually thinking of spouses or 
cohabiting nonmarital partners.13  But the law envisions the family and the 
home as connected in more ways than that; the law sees the home as host-
ing intimate familial relations, including parent-child relations, elder care, 
or new families.  This Part will demonstrate that living with others is al-
                                                          
 13.  See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007); 
Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 289 
(2011). 
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ready recognized by the law, but that this recognition is sporadic and not 
adequately justified. 
A.  Parenthood 
Establishing a parent-child relationship does not depend on co-
residence.  People may get divorced or move to other countries, but they 
still remain legal parents of their children.  However, co-residence is an im-
portant component in the definition of other parental roles.  For example, 
the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) principles propose two new legal sta-
tuses for parents: parent by estoppel and de facto parent.14  These statuses 
acknowledge people who function as parents without a biological or legal 
relation to the child.  A de facto parent is an individual who has lived with 
the child for a period of at least two years.15  A parent by estoppel is either 
one that is obligated to pay child support or an individual who, among other 
things, has lived with the child for at least two years, or since the child’s 
birth.16  There are other requirements, of course, but it is clear that in order 
to be considered an alternative form of parent, living with the child is, for 
the most part, essential.  Co-residence is understood to strengthen relation-
ship and reflect commitment. 
In addition, opening one’s home to a child can also be considered as 
accepting a commitment to care for him or her.  According to the California 
Family Code, a man is presumed to be a child’s natural father if “[he] re-
ceives the child into his . . . home and openly holds out the child as 
his . . . natural child.”17  In In re Nicholas,18 the court emphasized the im-
portance of co-residence by conflating love and home: “While his presumed 
father is providing a loving home for him, . . . his biological father, whose 
identity has never been judicially determined, has shown no interest.”19  In 
addition, the Uniform Parentage Act Section 204(5) (2002) creates a pre-
sumption of paternity for an unmarried man who, for the first two years of 
the child’s life, resided in the same household with the child and openly 
held out the child as his own.20 
The home therefore serves as a metaphor for accepting a child into 
one’s most intimate space, providing him or her physical and emotional 
shelter, and thus signaling that one treats that child as one’s own.21 
                                                          
 14.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.03(1) (2002) [hereinafter LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION].   
 15.  Id. § 2.03(1)(c). 
 16.  Id. § 2.03(1)(b). 
 17.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (2010). 
 18.  46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002). 
 19.  Id. at 933 (emphasis added). 
 20.  Unif. Parentage Act § 204(5) (2002). 
 21.  For other cases that emphasize co-residence, see Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 
(Cal. 2005) and Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2002).   
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B.  Partnership 
The cohabitation of married or unmarried couples proves significant 
under the current legal regime.  As Professor Steven Berenson explains, 
there are numerous doctrines that create rights and obligations between par-
ties depending on whether or not a couple is cohabiting.22  Regarding mar-
ried spouses, as McGuire v. McGuire23 famously determined, courts will 
normally not enforce a financial support duty if the married couple is co-
habiting.  Also, in California, when spouses live together the husband is 
conclusively presumed to be the father of any child born during their cohab-
itation.24  If a married couple is living apart at the time the child is born, the 
husband is only the presumed father of the child.25  Therefore, as long as a 
married couple live together, the law regards their relationship as a working 
relationship, assuming that the relationship is good and functions well for 
the parties, at least well enough to be left alone. 
Sharing a home becomes even more important when we move on to 
discuss unmarried couples.  When a marriage ends, there are clear rules that 
distribute the property accumulated during the marriage.  In the case of an 
unmarried cohabiting couple, the law is not entirely clear.  A majority of 
states have adopted a rule that cohabitation alone is not reason enough to 
award one partner a share of the other partner’s property accumulated dur-
ing the cohabitation period.26  But there is some disagreement over the is-
sue.  For example, according to the ALI’s Principles of Family Dissolution, 
the division of property between domestic partners is the same as between a 
married couple unless it is proven that, despite living together, the couple 
did not “share a life together as a couple.”27  Scholars have also advocated 
for a legal recognition of cohabiting couples.  Cynthia Bowman argues that 
many of the benefits awarded to married couples should be extended to 
unmarried cohabitants, if they lived together for more than two years and 
had a child together.28 
Sharing a residency becomes especially important when compared 
with a new form of relationship, termed by sociologists as “living apart to-
                                                          
 22.  See generally Berenson, supra note 13. 
 23.  McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953). 
 24.  Id. at 345. 
 25.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (2010).  The presumption can be rebutted by scientific evidence.  
See Berenson, supra note 13, at 289 n.3.  
 26.  See Berenson, supra note 13, at 29 (noting that a majority of states have followed “at 
least some aspects” of the California Supreme Court’s conclusion in Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 
106 (Cal. 1976), that implied contracts can be enforced between unmarried co-habitants). 
 27.  LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 14, at § 6.04; see also Berenson, supra note 
13, at 300. 
 28.  CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 223–24 
(2010). 
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gether.”29  Living apart together is a form of committed relationship that 
does not include a shared household.  Some scholars consider it a new fami-
ly form,30 particularly suitable for older divorcees, widows, and widowers 
who wish to develop intimate relations but still maintain a significant de-
gree of autonomy.31 Instead of living together, these relationships find inti-
macy outside of the home.  However, the law does not recognize living 
apart together relationships.  Even scholars that support legal recognition of 
cohabiting couples do not argue for similar relief for committed relation-
ships that do not include cohabitation.32  As a matter of legal reality and 
calls for reform, cohabitation is a necessary condition for establishing legal 
partnership in the absence of marriage. 
C.  Care for Dependent Relatives 
The state of Illinois has a unique rule that encourages family members 
to care for their elderly or disabled relatives.  Under certain circumstances, 
a relative who has provided such care will be able to bring a claim against 
the estate upon the death of the disabled person.33  In addition, the court 
may authorize and direct the guardian of the estate to make conditional gifts 
from the estate that will be distributed after the death of the disabled rela-
tive.34 
Generally, this provision allows family members to recover the “addi-
tional opportunity and emotional costs of committing their lives to disabled 
relatives.”35  According to the Supreme Court of Illinois, “The legislature 
chose to encourage private . . . care by rewarding . . . immediate family 
members . . . .”36  The provision does not deal with compensation for dam-
ages, but rather with awarding certain relatives for the “often unseen and 
intangible sacrifices made, and opportunities forgone” when a family mem-
ber commits his life to “making the lives of disabled persons better.”37 
A caretaker, according to the rule, is someone who “dedicates himself 
or herself to the care of the disabled person by living with and personally 
                                                          
 29.  Irene Levin & Jan Trost, Living Apart Together, 2 COMMUNITY, WORK & FAMILY 279, 
280 (1999). 
 30.  Irene Levin, Living Apart Together: A New Family Form?, 52 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 223 
(2004). 
 31.  Sofie Ghazanfareeon Karlsson & Klas Borell, Intimacy and Autonomy, Gender and Age-
ing: Living Apart Together, 27 AGEING INT’L 11 (2002). 
 32.  See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 13, at 317–19. 
 33.  755 ILSC 5/18-1.1 (2008).  For a discussion of the provision, see Heather M. Fossen For-
rest, Loosening the Wrapper on the Sandwich Generation: Private Compensation for Family 
Caregivers, 63 LA. L. REV. 381, 401–07 (2003). 
 34.  755 ILCS 5/11a-18.1(a).  
 35.  In re Estate of Jolliff, 771 N.E.2d 346, 351 (Ill. 2002).   
 36.  Id. at 356. 
 37.  Id. at 350. 
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caring for the disabled person for at least 3 years.”38  Illinois courts interpret 
these conditions strictly.  In one case, two and half years of care were 
deemed insufficient.39  The same court construed living with the disabled as 
requiring some sort of shared living arrangement, not just excessive visit-
ing.40 
The rule reflects an assumption that caring for someone becomes more 
dedicated, committed, and beneficial when the caretaker resides with the 
disabled person.  Sharing a home takes the relationship to another level of 
devotion and commitment, one worthy of compensation. 
D.  Rent Control 
When a tenant in a rent-controlled apartment has passed away or per-
manently vacated the premises, her family members who lived with her 
may be entitled to protection from eviction.  This protection is particularly 
interesting, as its development reflects the changing definitions of family.  
The New York Rent and Eviction Regulations Section 2204.6 (d) formerly 
provided that upon the death of a rent control tenant, the landlord could not 
evict the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of 
the deceased’s family who had been living with the tenant.41  The protection 
applied to people who lived with the tenant, but not to every person who re-
sided with her.  It required a particular relationship, one that could be 
termed familial, that involved co-residence.42  In Braschi v. Stahl Associates 
Co., the court considered whether a same-sex lifetime partner of the de-
ceased tenant falls under the definition of “family” in the regulation. 
The Braschi court concluded that the term family should not be re-
stricted to formal relations, but must take into account the reality of family 
life.43  The court also offered guidelines to distinguish between nonfamilial 
and familial relationships in the home.  Among these guidelines are “the 
exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and fi-
nancial commitment, the manner in which the parties have conducted their 
everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance placed 
upon one another for daily family services.”44 
The New York Rent and Eviction Regulations have embraced these 
criteria.  Current regulation stipulates that where a tenant has permanently 
vacated the housing accommodation and “such family member has resided 
with the tenant in the housing accommodation as a primary residence for a 
                                                          
 38.  755 ILCS 5/11a-18.1(a). 
 39.  In re Estate of Riordan, 814 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ill. App. 2004).  
 40.  Id. at 599; see also In re Estate of Hoehn, 600 N.E.2d 899, 900–01 (Ill. App. 1992).  
 41.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 2204.6(d) (1984) (amended 1989). 
 42.  Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989). 
 43.  543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989). 
 44.  Id. 
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period of no less than two years,” he or she will be protected from evic-
tion.45  The definition of “family members” is broad and includes formal 
relations, stepparents, in-laws, and unrelated persons, if there is an emo-
tional and financial commitment and interdependence.  I will return to the 
specific guidelines in Part IV. 
E.  Conclusion 
This brief review of familial rights and obligations has revealed the 
centrality of the home in law, not just for the individual, but as a site that 
fosters meaningful relationships.  Living together enriches the connection 
between individuals.  It makes them more of a family and seems to justify 
legally imposed obligations. 
When the relationship itself does not establish mutual rights and obli-
gations, shared living may sometimes provide the added element that trans-
forms its meaning.  When relations bear a resemblance to traditional pat-
terns of the family, shared residence can replace what the relationship lacks 
in formalities.  De facto parenthood and the cohabitation of couples are 
good examples.  The New York Rent and Eviction Regulations extend this 
conclusion to a wider range of relationships.  Although the lack of co-
residence does not undermine formal familial obligations, informal relations 
that do not include co-residence are viewed as merely friendship, not fami-
ly.46 
Under certain conditions, then, living with others is a meaningful ex-
perience endorsed by the law.  What the legal analysis is missing, however, 
is an explanation to support such an endorsement.  In particular, the law 
needs to articulate how and in what way living with others enhances com-
mitment and supports relationships.  Furthermore, it also has to stipulate at 
which point co-residence creates the relational and communal goods it is 
aimed at fostering, and to distinguish between different types of shared 
housing.  In particular, the property implications of living with others have 
yet to be explored.  Since living with others enhances commitment, the 
rules of eviction should presumably reflect this commitment.  Instead, the 
current rules defer to the owner’s authority to evict any unwanted cohabit-
ant from his or her home.  This rule falls in line with property law’s ethos of 
exclusion, the property owner’s wishes being held supreme.47  As I argue in 
Part V, the premise of this rule demands rethinking. 
                                                          
 45.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 2204.6(d) (1984) (amended 1989). 
 46.  See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text; see also Rosenbury, supra note 13.  
 47.  See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 
278 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1849, 1857–91 (2007).  But see Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive 
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009) (providing an alternative and progressive vision 
for property law).  
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In what follows, instead of discussing familial obligations in the home, 
I alternatively ask whether the relationship between the parties, founded on 
sharing a home, should be a source of certain rights and obligations in terms 
of property rights. 
II.  HOME-SHARING 
As previously demonstrated, relationships in the home are treated dif-
ferently than relationships outside the home.  The law ascribes meaning to 
co-residence in terms of the obligations between the parties.  The goal of 
this Part is to construe and construct the underlying values that co-residence 
promotes.  In doing so, it is important to distinguish between different types 
of shared living arrangements, and I will analyze and compare these differ-
ent types in Part III. 
American law has a strong ethos of protecting the home.  Benjamin 
Barros has described how the home is treated more favorably than any other 
type of property.48  This favorable treatment is embodied in a wide range of 
legal doctrines, including federal tax law, search and seizure law, post-
foreclosure rights of redemption, and statutes that concern just cause evic-
tion.49  Barros organizes the relevant doctrines that protect the home in two 
categories.  One concerns safety, freedom, and privacy in the home, and the 
other concerns possession.50  The latter protects the interest of the individu-
al to remain in the home she currently occupies.51  Protection of possession 
relies on Margaret Radin’s influential work on property as personhood.52 
Radin argues that the home is closely connected to personhood be-
cause it is the “scene of one’s history and future, one’s life and growth.”53  
It therefore deserves special protection.  Even though Radin’s argument has 
been significantly criticized,54 it has proved to be particularly telling regard-
ing American law’s vision of the home.55  The focus on privacy or posses-
                                                          
 48.  D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006). 
 49.  Id. at 256. 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 257. 
 52.  Id. at 276–78. 
 53.  Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 992 (1982). 
 54.  Professor Stephanie Stern argues that there is little evidence from psychological research 
to support the argument that the home constructs identity.  Instead, Stern argues that the home ex-
presses and maintains identity, at best.  Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Le-
gal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1110–11 (2009).  After all, in practice, people 
move from home to home all the time.  More critically, Professor Stephen Schnably has claimed 
that “the ideal of the home is not one simply constructed by individuals, but is one that has been 
actively fostered by the state and other ‘private’ actors wielding significant social power.”  Ste-
phen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property and Per-
sonhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 373–74 (1993). 
 55.  See Stern, supra note 54, at 1100.  
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sion reflects an ethos of the home as a castle,56 a sphere where one is left 
alone and is completely free.  The law therefore protects the home from 
outside threats: the state, creditors, or landlords.57  The home is thus per-
ceived as a site of individuality, one that has to be protected from intrusion.  
Consequently, the law treats the home as a black box; its internal workings, 
the relationships between co-occupants, are insignificant.  But alongside 
this individual dimension of the home as a refuge, the home is probably the 
most communal place there is.  Most people do not live alone,58 and for 
them a home is a site that hosts meaningful intimate relations.59  If home is 
a communal spatiality, what are the respective rights and obligations of co-
occupants?  How should the law treat relationships in the home? 
In his influential work on the household, Robert Ellickson provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the household and relationships in it.60  The pri-
mary strategy of living with others, according to his analysis, is consorting 
with intimates in order to minimize the risk of opportunistic behavior.  De-
cisions and rules in the home are formed in an informal way through gift 
exchange.  Ownership rights are assigned, much like in a firm, to providers 
of equity capital; and owners hold decision-making power on use and occu-
pancy in the home.  The normative basis of this analysis is a liberal vision 
supported by property and contract law, according to which all the parties 
have the ability to exit the home, and the owner holds ultimate control over 
the premises. 
This analysis indeed describes the internal workings of the home.  It 
explains some of its unique features, such as negotiation strategies and the 
identity of co-occupants.  Yet, it does not fully appreciate the relational and 
communal aspects of sharing a home.  A home is more than a physical 
structure.  Not every dwelling place is understood as a home.  What we call 
a home is a composition of the human interaction and the physical space.  
Indeed, social science studies clearly show that relationships within the 
home are so tied up to the meaning of home that they often affect, for better 
or worse, people’s choice to call a particular dwelling a home.61  The ongo-
ing communication with others, whether positive or difficult, lies at the core 
of the experience of the home.  The home, then, is a communal creation, 
                                                          
 56.  On privacy, see JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 2–5, 55–57 (2009); see also Robert M. Rakoff, Ideolo-
gy in Everyday Life: The Meaning of the House, 7 POL. & SOC’Y 85, 86 (1977); Barros, supra 
note 48, at 259; Stern, supra note 54, at 1100.  
 57.  See, e.g., Lorna Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Chal-
lenge? 29 J. L. & SOC’Y 580 (2002). 
 58.  For some data on number of occupants and type of relationships see Ellickson, supra note 
6, at 254, 255. 
 59.  Lisa M. Austin, Person, Place, or Thing? Property and the Structuring of Social Rela-
tions, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 445 (2010). 
 60.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 61.  Sandy G. Smith, The Essential Qualities of a Home, 14 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 31, 39 (1994). 
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and, in many cases, it is not an individual achievement.  The purpose of this 
Part is to articulate the nature of this common endeavor and of sharing a 
home. 
Relationships in the home are uniquely close and intimate even if dif-
ficult at times.  Other interactions, as meaningful as they may be, are lim-
ited in terms of the intensity of the relation, mostly because relations in the 
workplace, community, or at school are limited in scope and time.  One can 
always escape from these locations to her shelter, the home.  In all other re-
lations, then, we still have some control and can retreat back to our home, 
but relationships within the home remain constantly intense.  Despite recent 
trends that challenge geographical locations and emphasize the rise of virtu-
al communities,62 the home has not lost its meaning. 
In spite of the significant relational and communal dimensions of the 
home,63 it is important to note that the goods arising from a home-sharing 
community are not merely communal goods.  Home-sharing contributes to 
forming a personal identity and the construction of autonomy through the 
distinction between self and others.  It creates a close and immediate com-
munity that supports the individual’s need of shelter and repose.  It unites 
the individual and the relational, and both aspects, with their resulting ten-
sion, represent the benefits of home-sharing. 
In fact, the home contains a paradox: the most personal place is also 
the most communal, deeply other-regarding.64  When I share my home with 
another person, I share my most intimate space and at the same time I have 
to acknowledge the other’s wants and needs and behave in a manner that is 
respectful of others.65  In other words, the home is a complex concept that 
encompasses a dialectics between individuality and being other-regarding.  
Living together in the home allows the individual to shape the boundaries 
of the self and create a space that is completely personal and private (for 
example, a room, a closet, or drawers).  On the other hand, living with oth-
                                                          
 62.  For the growing importance of online communities, see Celene Navarrete A. & Esperan-
za Huerta, Building Virtual Bridges to Home: The Use of the Internet by Transnational Communi-
ties of Immigrants, 11 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 7 (2006); Nicholas Suzor, Order Supported by 
Law: The Enforcement of Rules in Online Communities, 63 MERCER L. REV. 523 (2012).  
 63.  For the relational and communal aspects of property in general see, e.g., Joseph W. Sing-
er, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).  For the communal aspects of 
property, see Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Peñalver, Properties of Communities, 10 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 127 (2009); Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 
YALE L. J. 549 (2001); Amnon Lehavi, How Property Can Create, Maintain, or Destroy Commu-
nity, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 43 (2009). 
 64.  For the relational, other-regarding characteristics of property, see Jennifer Nedelsky, 
Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162, 162 (1991).  
 65.  Compare this argument to Hegelian justifications for private property.  The property is an 
external object, to use the Hegelian vocabulary, by which one expresses her will, and recognizes 
others’ will, and through the recognition of others, one recognizes herself.  See ALAN BRUDNER, 
THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN JURISPRUDENCE 34–38 (1995); Dudley 
Knowles, Hegel on Property and Personality, 33 PHIL. Q. 45, 56–57 (1983). 
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ers forces the individual to open up to others, include them in her own vi-
sion of home, not merely exclude them.66  As some philosophers have per-
suasively asserted, the home is a profoundly relational concept as it means 
acceptance, being with others.67  In the home, friction arises among all the 
needs and wants, complementary or conflicting; and it is necessary to inter-
act with others, whether one wants to or not, because the other is in one’s 
most personal intimate space.  This process at its best offers acceptance of 
the other despite occasional conflicts.  Judith Sixsmith, a social scientist, 
eloquently explains: 
[S]ocial networks built around a home and the relationships that 
create and are created in a home are of utmost importance. 
  . . .  It is familiarity with other people, their habits, emotions, 
actions etc., indeed the very knowledge that they are there, which 
creates an atmosphere of social understanding whereby the per-
son[’]s own opinions, actions and moods are accepted, if not al-
ways welcomed.68 
All this suggests that living with others creates interdependency.69  
The degree of dependency varies in different contexts, but the experience 
requires each cohabitant to put herself in a vulnerable position because she 
has to consider the needs of others and accept the other’s consideration of 
hers. 
Home-sharing is thus a personal and a communal project at the same 
time.  When I use the term “home-sharing community,” I mean that living 
together creates a sense of cohesion and commitment among cohabitants70 
that requires rethinking their legal relationship.  As property scholars have 
previously noted, the benefits of communal efforts and a sense of belong-
ingness are an important part of a normative account of property law.71 
                                                          
 66.  For a critique on the centrality of exclusion in property law, see HANOCH DAGAN, 
PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37–57 (2011); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obliga-
tion Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Eduardo M. Peñalver, 
Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005); Joseph W. Singer, Democratic Estate: Prop-
erty Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009).   
 67.  Shelley Mallett, Understanding Home: A Critical Review of the Literature, 52 SOC. REV. 
62, 83 (2004) (discussing the philosophical theories of Kuang Ming Wu and Martin Buber). 
 68.  Judith Sixsmith, The Meaning of Home: An Exploratory Study of Environmental Experi-
ence, 6 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 281, 291 (1986). 
 69.  Cf. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 63 (describing interdependence as a necessary 
condition for human flourishing); Gregory S. Alexander, Unborn Communities, 8 LAW & ETHICS 
HUM. RTS. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing mutual dependency between subsequent generations). 
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 71.  See Carolyn Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 
81 (2004) (defining marriage as a liberal egalitarian community); Dagan & Heller, supra note 63 
(highlighting the benefits of cooperation to the liberal commons); Peñalver, supra note 66 (treat-
ing the family as a type of involuntary community). 
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But community also contains a risk of vulnerability and subordination.  
So does the home.  Relationships in the home can be offensive and intru-
sive.  The home, it has been argued, is a prison for women,72 the glorifica-
tion of which pushes them to care for the family.73  This criticism is in-
spired by a vision of the home as a patriarchal institution—a locus for the 
conjugal relationship.  Yet, the concept of home can be more inclusive, and 
accept a wide variety of intimate associations.  In addition, communities 
carry risks for freedom and autonomy.  With community comes pressure, 
the oppression of minorities, and difficulties of exit.74  Home-sharing en-
tails similar risks.  Living with others means compromise.  Sometimes it 
does not succeed, resulting in miserable cohabitants.75  At times, a cohabit-
ant may experience home-sharing as a violation of her privacy and autono-
my.  When it comes to constructing rules regarding entrance to and exit 
from home-sharing, the law should support home-sharing and protect co-
habitants from the sudden loss of this community, but at the same time be 
mindful of the risks of living with others when the relationship turns sour.  
This discussion will prove important in considering the appropriate reme-
dies for exiting the community. 
Another element of living with others is financial security.  Under the 
current reality of recession, and in light of economic hardship, sharing a 
home clearly offers financial gain.  This gain does not necessarily negate 
the communal and relational benefits of living with others, but rather com-
plements them.76  As long as the benefits of home-sharing are not purely 
economic, financial support can serve to strengthen mutual dependency. 
In addition to the benefits of cohesion and commitment, people who 
live together create their home together.  The home is a space where people 
interact that is shaped by the competing wants and needs of all cohabitants.  
The combination of space and unique interaction creates something new.  
The decoration and styling, the use of facilities, and the rules of conduct are 
all a product of the encounter between the self and others who live in the 
home.  Each person who lives in the home influences, to some extent at 
least, the physical and relational spatiality.  The nature of the shared space 
results from agreements or disagreements among all the people living in the 
                                                          
 72.  For the effect of domestic violence law on the concept of home, see Jeannie Suk, Crimi-
nal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006). 
 73.  See Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing “Home”: A Re-Analysis of Gender, Homeownership and 
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home.  Room allocation, the use of furniture and appliances, and standards 
of behavior are formed through direct or indirect negotiation. 
Take, for example, adolescents. Sociological studies point to their dif-
ficulties in handling rules forced on them by parents.77  Nonetheless, teen-
agers affect the home.  Arguments and disagreements change the atmos-
phere in the home, and negotiation over the rules shapes standards of be-
behavior even if the adolescent’s success is limited; performing chores also 
contributes to the household.  Because every cohabitant contributes to the 
creation of the home, she also has a stake in the home.  Although this stake 
does not amount to a right to control the asset, it does require some protec-
tion of her interest, as Part V explains. 
And yet, some people live alone.78  Nothing in my argument suggests 
that one should avoid living alone or that it is an inferior choice.  Moreover, 
not every group of people living together creates a home-sharing communi-
ty.  Occasionally people live together because it saves resources and it is 
convenient, such as when roommates share a living space.  People can and 
should choose different arrangements along the continuum between indi-
viduality and communal life.  The relationship between roommates is still 
characterized by immediate interaction and mutual consideration, but the 
parties purposefully limit their interaction to the minimum required.  The 
law should offer different categories of shared living arrangements, each 
with its own set of legal responsibilities and rights.79  In the next Part, I of-
fer three main categories of co-residence, based on the intensity of the 
community created in the home.  Recognizing home-sharing does not 
oblige others to choose this option.  Yet if people decide to share their home 
in a way that creates a home-sharing community, then the law should im-
prove the rules that define their respective rights and obligations. 
One may argue that legal recognition of a home-sharing community 
interferes with intimate relations by regulating the realm of emotions.  Rela-
tionships in the home, according to this argument, mean more when they 
are unfettered by legal incentives.  Yet, the concept of a home-sharing 
community does not seek to regulate an ongoing relationship.  Rather, it in-
forms parties of the commitment they take upon themselves when they 
choose to enter a home-sharing community and asks them to terminate the 
community in a respectful way.  As I will further demonstrate, the set of 
                                                          
 77.  Naomi Rosh White, Not Under My Roof: Young People’s Experience of Home, 34 
YOUTH & SOC’Y 214, 217 (2002). 
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remedies targets the owner’s decision-making process and encourages dis-
cussion between the parties, leaving the specific content of the agreement 
for the parties to figure out. 
III.  THE CATEGORIES OF LIVING WITH OTHERS 
Not all patterns of co-residence are the same.  It is important to distin-
guish between mere co-residence, which factually references a number of 
people sharing a home, and home-sharing, which normatively defines a 
property community that creates a home together.  Under the broad defini-
tion of co-residence, I identify three distinct categories.  Although in real 
life not all cases will be so easily classified, the categorization serves the 
analytical and normative function of defining home-sharing communities. 
The first category includes cases of common residence that are based 
on comfort and individuality.  In these cases, all legal responsibilities be-
tween the parties depend on their explicit contractual obligations.  The sec-
ond category concerns cases where a home-sharing community has been 
created.  This category represents the core of the argument and will be dis-
cussed at length in Part V.  Typically, such arrangements concern formal 
right holders and occupants that have no formal property rights.  The test 
case for the article is intergenerational home-sharing, in particular adult 
children living with their parents in a home owned by the parents.  The third 
category concerns home-sharing cases that include an additional element: 
the sharing of financial resources.  In certain circumstances, such cases may 
justify the acknowledgment of a proprietary interest in the home through 
legal rules of constructive trust or equitable lien.  In what follows, I explain 
the distinctions between these categories and their normative significance.  I 
will begin with the first and third categories, and then turn to the main ar-
gument that deals with home-sharing in Part V. 
A.  Roommates versus Home-sharing 
There are two main guidelines that support a distinction between mere 
co-residence and a home-sharing community.  The first guideline concerns 
the nature of sharing, while the second guideline involves the nature of the 
commitment.  The main query is whether living together in the home serves 
a primarily individual motivation and practice, and whether everyday life at 
home reveals a commitment to the wellbeing of co-occupants. 
Andrew Mason’s distinction between a mere association and a com-
munity is useful here.80  A mere association consists of people who interact 
with one another on a contractual basis.  The typical roommates may care 
for each other but at the end of the day, they live together in order to further 
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their self-regarding interests.  A community, by contrast, is a group of peo-
ple with goals that cannot be reduced to the goals of each individual mem-
ber.81  Home-sharing is not just about sharing a common space; it is pro-
foundly other-regarding.  Mason’s moralized community clarifies this 
point.  It requires solidarity or mutual concern—members must give each 
other’s interests some non-instrumental weight—and permits no systematic 
exploitation or systematic injustice.82  A home-sharing community is other-
regarding, while mere co-residence is self-regarding.  Other-regarding be-
havior and communal efforts may include shared use of the home, common 
decision-making mechanisms, and shared rules of conduct. 
The second guideline concerns long-term commitment.  The main 
question is whether the parties experience the arrangement as merely tem-
porary or as long-term and possibly permanent.  The longevity of the ar-
rangement is important because it affects the willingness of the parties to 
invest in the home in a variety of ways, including emotional investment, 
sacrifices, and contribution to the household, as well as their willingness to 
cooperate in the space and enter a mutually dependent relationship. 
Let me clarify by using an example.  In Borough of Glassboro v. Val-
lorosi,83 the main issue was a restrictive zoning ordinance that limited resi-
dence in certain districts to families only.  The ordinance defined family as 
“one or more persons occupying a dwelling unit as a single non-profit 
housekeeping unit, who are living together as a stable and permanent living 
unit, being a traditional family unit or the functional equivalency [sic] 
thereof.”84 
The New Jersey Supreme Court had to decide whether a group of ten 
college students that shared a home together constituted a family according 
to the ordinance.  Seven of the students were sophomores at the time they 
started living in the house.  The students each had a separate, renewable 
lease for a semester-long period.  At the end of each semester, each resident 
could renew the lease if the house was found to be in order.  The students 
shared a kitchen, ate together in small groups, and shared the household 
chores.  They opened a common checking account to pay for food and other 
bills. All of them planned to live in the house until graduation.85 
The court decided that these ten college students living together did 
constitute a family, but this decision clearly reflected the court’s criticism of 
                                                          
 81.  Mason’s full definition of an ordinary community is not applicable to the home.  It re-
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 83.  568 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1990). 
 84.  Id. at 889. 
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the ordinance.86  Since zoning law is not the topic of investigation here, let 
us analyze the facts from a different perspective, one that focuses on home-
sharing.  First, we need to evaluate whether the co-residence appears to be 
other-regarding.  The students lived together because it was a convenient 
arrangement.  The atmosphere appeared to be pleasant and friendly, but the 
whole arrangement was founded on individual motivations.  It is important 
to note, however, that the fact that the students meant to save money by liv-
ing together does not necessarily imply a home-sharing community did not 
exist.  Rather, it depends on whether that consideration was dominant and 
shaped the home environment. 
Second, there appears to have been no long-term commitment between 
the ten roommates.  The students committed to a short period of four 
months at a time.  Their overall plan was to share a home for three years un-
til they graduated from college.  In addition, they did make several deci-
sions together, but these decisions dealt with the day-to-day running of the 
household and not with long-term planning.  To sum up, these ten college 
roommates did not constitute a home-sharing community. 
Even though I conclude that Borough of Glassboro does not portray a 
home-sharing community, this does not mean that the court’s decision is 
mistaken.  The concept of home-sharing highlights legal obligations be-
tween the parties.  In particular, it is meant to provoke lawyers and scholars 
into rethinking the current rules of exit from a home-sharing community.  
Nevertheless, the concept of living together in the home can indeed serve to 
illuminate some of the difficulties this type of case raises. 
This does not mean, of course, that all zoning cases deal with mere co-
residence.  In the case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio,87 the zon-
ing ordinance narrowly defined family.88  The ordinance did not recognize 
the Moore family, which included Mrs. Inez Moore, her son, and two 
grandsons, Dale and John.  John came to live with his grandmother follow-
ing his mother’s death when he was a baby, and he was a ten-year-old child 
at the time the case was decided.89  The court held that the ordinance was 
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unconstitutional as it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Although the judgment did not provide details regarding the 
decision-making procedures, or behavior and everyday practices in the 
home, the facts indicated a long-term, ten-year commitment to caring for 
minor children.90  In addition, in his concurrence, Justice Brennan pointed 
out that intergenerational bonds are an important source of emotional and 
financial support in certain communities.91  His words remain true today, as 
intergenerational home-sharing continues to be a rising phenomenon.92 
The courts in zoning cases tend to search for characteristics of family 
as broadly as they can define it.  They therefore use criteria such as “cohe-
siveness and permanence”93 or “stable and permanent living unit.”94  These 
criteria bear some resemblance to the guidelines suggested here as defining 
a home-sharing community.  Yet zoning cases are not about the commit-
ments of the parties to one another.  They deal with public interventions in 
people’s choice of home.  A home is more than a physical dwelling; it is 
shaped by the relationships in it.  People should be able to choose not only 
whom to live with, but also their desired level of commitment, cohesive-
ness, or cooperation.  Therefore, restrictions of these choices should be in-
terpreted narrowly and occasionally struck down regardless of the long-
term cohesiveness of the relationships within the home.  Restrictive regula-
tion contradicts the plural understanding of home. 
People should be able to choose their home.  There is a variety of op-
tions along the continuum between individuality and communal life in the 
home.  Living alone is one option; living with others while preserving the 
individual’s commitment-free lifestyle is another.  The communal creation 
of home is a third possibility.  People have different preferences at different 
points in their lives, and they should be allowed to choose from a spectrum 
of available options.95 
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B.  Home-sharing versus Shared Lives96 
The “shared lives” category has a home-sharing community as its ba-
sis, but includes an additional element: the sharing of financial resources.  
This discussion will help clarify what a home-sharing community is, and 
then distinguish it from the more committed form of shared lives.  The 
shared life metaphor is intuitively appropriate for the relationship between 
spouses or informally committed couples.  Indeed, couples usually live to-
gether and share financial resources.  Yet once we focus on the relationship 
within the home, more complex forms of social interaction arise. 
Let us consider the Frambach v. Dunihue case.97  Mr. Dunihue was a 
widower with seven children.98  The Frambachs lived nearby with their four 
children.  The relationship between these two families began when Mrs. 
Frambach babysat for Mr. Dunihue’s children on occasion for a few 
months.  Later, the Frambachs and the Dunihues waited out a hurricane to-
gether in the Frambachs’ home.  This arrangement was so enjoyable that the 
two families decided to live together in the Frambachs’ home and did so for 
nineteen years.  During that period, Mr. Dunihue made some improvements 
to the house, which was small and had no indoor plumbing.  Each family 
had a separate bank account, but Mrs. Frambach had access to both ac-
counts and decided which account would be used to pay a particular bill.  
The three also shopped together for clothes, furniture, and automobiles.  
Mr. Dunihue characterized the arrangement as “one family.”99  One day 
Mrs. Frambach called Mr. Dunihue at work and told him he had thirty 
minutes to move out.100 
Mr. Dunihue argued that “the Frambachs had promised him a place to 
live for the rest of his life in exchange for his work,”101 and he requested 
that an equitable lien be imposed on the property.  The trial court concluded 
that they were all a single family unit, that the separation should be treated 
as a divorce, and that the fair result would be to “make them tenants in 
common right down the middle.”102  The appellate court reversed the deci-
sion.  It found “no evidence of a promise or agreement to deed a portion of 
the Frambachs’ property to Dunihue in return for the improvements.”103  
                                                          
 96.  The term “shared life” is borrowed from Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: 
Analysis and Recommendations.  LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 14, § 6.03.  The 
Principles discuss factors that are considered in determining whether a couple “share[s] a life to-
gether.”  My use of the expression is not limited to couples, but extends to all relationships in the 
home that have an additional element of sharing resources. 
 97.  419 So.2d 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
 98.  Id. at 1116. 
 99.  Id.  The court approved of this characterization.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 1116–17. 
 102.  Id. at 1117 (quoting the trial court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103.  Id. 
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The only relevant question was whether Dunihue’s “contributions ex-
ceed[ed] the value of the benefits received by him from the Frambachs,”104 
and the court suspected the contributions would prove equal. 
If we look at the case from the perspective of relationships in the 
home, it is quite clear that the parties lived in a home-sharing community.  
The arrangement was other-regarding.  Each adult had a role that contribut-
ed to the household, and all were committed to the creation of the home.  
As opposed to the facts in Borough of Glassboro, neither the Frambachs nor 
Mr. Dunihue had a deadline in mind for ending the arrangement.  They all 
allowed the relationship to develop naturally over time.  It was a permanent, 
cohesive relationship, not a temporary one.  Moreover, decisions regarding 
the home structure, its functionality, and use were made together.  The stu-
dents in Borough of Glassboro also made decisions together.  But the stu-
dents’ decisions dealt with day-to-day management of the house, while the 
three adults in Frambach also dealt with long-term planning. 
In Frambach, the home-sharing community ended abruptly.  The 
Frambachs made their decision unilaterally.  They did not allow Dunihue to 
respond, nor did they give him an opportunity to change their mind.  He 
was ordered to move out immediately, and had no time to come to terms 
with the end of his home and the relationships in it.  In short, the property’s 
formal owners decided to exclude him from his home.105 
But the parties were not only sharing a home; they also shared finan-
cial resources and acted as a single family unit.  Dunihue invested funds 
and labor in improving the Frambachs’ home.  The parties also had inter-
mingled finances and relied on each other’s earnings for the common ne-
cessities of life.106  This additional element takes us beyond the home into a 
more committed relationship that includes the pooling of resources.  As the 
trial court reasoned, a committed couple seems to be the best analogy for 
this shared-lives community that functions as a single economic unit.107 
                                                          
 104.  Id.  
 105.  I argue in the Part V that exit rules should allow for the voice of the excluded resident. 
 106.  For similar criteria, see  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 2204.6(d) (3) (b–c) 
(1984) (amended 1989). 
 107.  Another esoteric set of facts can be found in In re Marriage of Bauder, 605 P.2d 1374 
(Or. Ct. App. 1980).  The case dealt with a married couple that owned a home together and took in 
a roomer, Mr. Hart.  The couple and Hart lived together and shared resources.  They had a three-
way joint checking account.  At one point, Hart was the only one employed and contributed more 
than half the deposits.  Id. at 1375.  When the husband suspected Hart of intending to leave, he 
asked the wife to present herself sexually to the roomer.  Id. at 1376.  The wife became pregnant 
following this sexual relationship.  As part of a divorce proceeding, Hart claimed that he was 
promised a one-third interest in the house.  The court held that the evidence did not support an 
express agreement.  The court then asserted that “the fact that an unmarried person cohabits with a 
married couple should not give rise to any inference that the parties agreed to share incomes or 
property acquired during cohabitation.”  Id.  If the couple had promised an interest in property in 
return for the deposits and Hart had acted in reliance on said promise, then a constructive trust 
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There are a number of rules that recognize informal relations that func-
tion as a familial economic unit.  The New York Rent and Eviction Regula-
tions protect from eviction a family member of a tenant who has permanent-
ly vacated the apartment.108  The definition of family member is broad.  In 
addition to sharing a home, the rules emphasize financial interdepend-
ence109 and intermingling of finances.110  The ALI’s principles concerning 
the determination of domestic partnership include similar criteria.111  In 
Canada, domestic partnership focuses on economic interdependence regard-
less of conjugality.112 
Although a detailed account of the single economic unit exceeds the 
scope of this article, these cases help highlight the conceptual boundaries of 
the home-sharing community.  Financial interdependence and pooling of 
resources contribute to the commitment of the parties.  Combination of 
economic efforts implies a willingness to share a life together.113  I previ-
ously distinguished home-sharing from mere co-residence.  It is equally 
critical to distinguish between shared lives and home-sharing.  The former 
may justify, under certain conditions, a distribution of property or contribu-
tion-based restitution.114  The latter does not.  This Article deals with home-
sharing cases that do not amount to shared lives, focusing specifically on 
adult children living with their parents.  It is these cases that are most chal-
lenging to contemporary legal thought because they cannot be definitively 
analogized to any existing legal institution. 
                                                          
could have been established.  But under these circumstances, the court concluded “[f]or all that 
appears, he got what he bargained for.”  Id.  
 108.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 2204.6(d)(1). 
 109.  Id. § 2204.6 (d)(3) (defining a family member as “any other person residing with the ten-
ant in the housing accommodation as a primary residence who can prove emotional and financial 
commitment, and interdependence between such person and the tenant”).  
 110.  Evidence of such commitment includes, for example, the longevity of the relationship, 
reliance on each other for the payment of expenses or common necessities.  Id. 
 111.  LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 14, at § 6.03.  These criteria include, for ex-
ample:  
The extent to which the parties intermingled their finances . . . [t]he extent to which 
their relationship fostered the parties’ economic interdependence, or the economic de-
pendence of one party upon the other; . . . [t]he extent to which the parties engaged in 
conduct and assumed specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance of their life to-
gether; . . . [t]he extent to which the relationship wrought change in the life of either or 
both parties; . . . [and t]he extent to which the parties acknowledged responsibilities to 
each other . . . .   
Id. 
 112.  See Rosenbury, supra note 13, at 221–22; see also LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, 
BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT 
RELATIONSHIPS 114 (2001). 
 113.  Adilson José Moreira, We Are Family! Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Unions in Brazil, 
60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1003, 1016 (2012). 
 114.  See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 167–68, 178 (2004). 
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IV.  HOME-SHARING IN CONTEXT: THE CASE OF ADULT CHILDREN AND 
THEIR PARENTS 
In the previous Part, I defined the boundaries of a home-sharing com-
munity.  Here I move on to consider the particulars of the concept.  Sharing 
a home is a contextual concept; the social background defines its contours.  
Because the law conflates the home and the family,115 a discussion of 
home-sharing is especially productive in the face of changes in family 
structure.  The social context is important because different relationships 
entail different risks and benefits.  Cohabitation of adult children with their 
parents is different from cohabitation of unmarried couples or cohabitation 
of elderly parents living with their adult child in a home owned by their 
child.  The possibility that the parties will continue to have a close relation-
ship, the economic consequences of ending the community, and the risk of 
exploitation are all affected by the type of relationship and the social con-
text.  I therefore turn to discuss the widespread phenomenon of adult chil-
dren living with their parents. 
In previous decades, sociological common wisdom pointed to a de-
cline in the importance of the modern nuclear family as a social institu-
tion.116  More recent scholarship stresses the increasingly important multi-
generational bonds, at times at the expense of the nuclear family.117  Two 
processes are particularly significant: The aging of the population results in 
“longer years of shared lives” between different generations.118  In addition, 
grandparents and other kin play an increasingly important role in supplying 
care for children.119  High divorce rates and births out of wedlock make 
women more likely to be single mothers and rely on the assistance of their 
extended kin, especially their own mothers.120 
Parents help their adult children in a variety of ways, including finan-
cial assistance and the provision of their time, as in taking care of grand-
children.  One of the ways to assist adult children is through shared living 
arrangements, either for married children who move in with their entire 
family, or for single adults.121  In fact, adult children living with their par-
                                                          
 115.  See infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 116.  David Popenoe, American Family Decline, 1960–1990: A Review and Appraisal, 55 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 527 (1993); Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter? 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483 
(1995). 
 117.  Vern L. Bengtson, Beyond the Nuclear Family: The Increasing Importance of Multigen-
erational Bonds, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1 (2001). 
 118.  Id. at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 119.  Id. at 4. 
 120.  Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Intergenerational Ties: Alternative Theories, Empirical Find-
ings and Trends, and Remaining Challenges, in INTERGENERATIONAL CAREGIVING 3, 6 (Alan 
Booth et al., eds. 2008).  
 121.  Id. 
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ents is a rising phenomenon not only in the United States;122 it has become 
a global trend.123  American adults in their twenties and early thirties are 
more likely to be living with their parents than in previous generations.124  
Hilary Farber points out that even though there are relatively high rates of 
co-residence among non-white racial and ethnic groups, recent trends in liv-
ing arrangements suggest intergenerational co-residence is a much more 
pervasive phenomenon.125  According to the United States Census Bureau 
population report from 2007, six percent “of all family groups contained a 
householder and his or her adult children.”126  A recent Pew Research Cen-
ter report found that in 2012, thirty-six percent of America’s young adults 
ages eighteen to thirty-one were living with their parents, a record number 
of 21.6 million young adults.127  Younger adults (eighteen to twenty-four) 
are much more likely to live with their parents than older ones (twenty-five 
to thirty-one).128 
The reasons for this new household structure include the economic 
downturn and housing crisis.129  As the recession deepens, the economic 
climate makes it harder for college graduates to become financially inde-
pendent, and they therefore need their parents’ assistance.130  In addition, 
homeowners in their thirties and forties are sometimes forced to move back 
in with their parents due to foreclosure.131 
This new structure of the home has raised much concern for children 
and parents alike, as several empirical studies have demonstrated.  Children 
often experience an inability to influence decisionmaking in the home and 
the loss of privacy and autonomy.132  Parental rules regarding sexual rela-
                                                          
 122.  Jennifer Reid Keene & Christine D. Batson, Under One Roof: A Review of Research on 
Intergenerational Coresidence and Multigenerational Households in the United States, 4/8 
SOCIOLOGY COMPASS 642, 643 (2010). 
 123.  See Clara H. Mulder et al., A Comparative Analysis of Leaving Home in the United 
States, the Netherlands and West Germany, 7 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 565, 586–87 (2002).  For Isra-
el, see Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Intergenerational Relations and the Family Home, 8 LAW & ETHICS 
HUM. RTS. 131 (2014).  For Canada, see Barbara A. Mitchell et al., “There’s no Place like 
Home”: An Analysis of Young Adults’ Mature Coresidency in Canada, 54 INT’L J. AGING & HUM. 
DEV. 57 (2002). 
 124.  Sharon Sassler et al., Are They Really Mama’s Boys/Daddy’s Girls?  The Negotiation of 
Adulthood upon Returning to the Parental Home, 23 SOC. F. 670 (2008). 
 125.  Farber, supra note 2, at 43, 65. 
 126.  KREIDER & ELLIOT, supra note 78, at 6.  The report explains that “[e]veryone living in a 
housing unit makes up a household.  One of the people who owns or rents the residence is desig-
nated as the householder.”  Id. at 2. 
 127.  RICHARD FRY, PEW RES. CTR., A RISING SHARE OF YOUNG ADULTS LIVE IN THEIR 
PARENTS’ HOME 1 (2013). 
 128.  Id.  The former accounts for fifty-six percent of all children living with their parents, the 
latter for sixteen percent. 
 129.  Keene & Batson, supra note 122, at 642. 
 130.  Farber, supra note 2, at 68–69. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  White, supra note 77, at 228–29.  
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tionships at home, requirements concerning information on children’s 
whereabouts, and control of domestic spaces by parents are all indicative of 
loss of autonomy and independence.133  Young adults may feel not at home 
in their parents’ home.  On the other hand, children who return to live with 
their parents often talk about “coming home.”134  There is a constant tension 
between the need for independence and the need for emotional support and 
guidance provided by parents.135  The literature shows that when the child 
contributes to the household, he or she will feel more independent, in con-
trol, and consequently at home.136  In general, the more voice a child gets in 
decisions about the household, and the more he or she contributes to the 
household or assumes responsibility in familial roles, the more that child 
will feel at home, or part of the family.137  The nature and quality of the re-
lationship with the parents are also important parameters. 
Empirical research has also examined parents’ attitudes towards co-
habitation with their adult children.  The findings reveal a complex picture.  
Some scholars argue that living with adult children encourages conflict and 
leads to a strained relationship.138  Other scholars emphasize positive expe-
riences of shared living arrangements.139  The most significant indicator for 
parental satisfaction from cohabitation is the relationship between the child 
and the parent.140  In addition, reciprocity is a significant indicator, mani-
fested either by paying rent or board, or offering emotional support.141  
Spending time together and sharing enjoyable activities are also associated 
with parental satisfaction.  To sum up, parents can enjoy certain goods from 
co-residence with their adult children.  Among these goods are affection, 
companionship, and a sense of a family.142  On the other hand, children with 
                                                          
 133.  Id. at 218.  Cf. Evie Kins et al., Patterns of Home Leaving and Subjective Well-Being in 
Emerging Adulthood: The Role of Motivational Processes and Parental Autonomy Support, 45 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1416 (2009) (examining the role of autonomous motivation in choos-
ing a living arrangement).   
 134.  White, supra note 77, at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 135.  Id.  Some research shows that a close relationship with parents during adolescence in-
creases the chances of an adult child living with her parents.  See Mitchell et al., supra note 123, at 
64.  For a position that views adult children living with parents as needy, see Inge Seiffge-Krenke, 
Leaving Home or Still in the Nest? Parent-Child Relationships and Psychological Health as Pre-
dictors of Different Leaving Home Patterns, 42 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 864 (2006). 
 136.  White, supra note 77, at 222–23.  
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See the literature reviewed in Barbara A. Mitchell, Too Close for Comfort? Parental As-
sessments of “Boomerang Kid” Living Arrangements, 23 CANADIAN J. SOC. 21, 23 (1998). 
 139.  Id.; see also William S. Aquilino & Khalil R. Supple, Parent-Child Relations and Par-
ent’s Satisfaction with Living Arrangements When Adult Children Live at Home, 53 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAM. 13, 17 (1991). 
 140. Aquilino & Supple, supra note 139, at 20–22. 
 141.  Mitchell, supra note 138, at 40. 
 142.  Id. at 35–37. 
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a difficult personality or negative lifestyle and the lack of privacy are asso-
ciated with negative experiences of co-residence.143 
A recent study conducted in Europe exposes a correlation between late 
leaving of the parental home and a close relationship with parents in later 
stages of life, including living in proximity to the parents’ home and high 
frequency of contact.144  This finding suggests that home-sharing by parents 
and children can be part of a stronger connection built upon long-term reci-
procity.  Nonetheless, although the study did not explore elder care and fo-
cused on the relationship itself, it did indicate that the late leavers continue 
to rely on parental assistance. 
Clearly the research in this field is constantly developing and to some 
extent contingent.  However, identifying the factors that enhance the goods 
and risks of home-sharing will contribute to the construction of legal rules.  
Empirical research sheds light on home-sharing in context because it targets 
a specific relationship and alerts us to particular risks that this relationship 
entails.  The most prominent conclusion from the research is that the child’s 
contribution to the household appears to be significant to both the parent 
and the child.  It allows the child to achieve a greater degree of independ-
ence and autonomy, and the reciprocity is foundational for parents.  The 
quality of the relationship is also important.  These principles are supported 
by empirical analysis, but might just as well have been deduced from a 
more abstract inquiry into the goods of parents’ and children’s co-residence. 
V.  RETHINKING THE LAW OF HOME-SHARING 
This new residential pattern raises new legal problems.  What is the 
correct characterization of the child’s interest in the home?  The parents 
own the house and the child lives with them based on their permission.  
Formally, the child is a mere licensee and her license can be revoked at will.  
This formalistic analysis does not account for the relational and communal 
aspects of the home.  In many cases, the child contributed to the community 
in the home and was an inseparable part of it.  He was not only a member of 
the home-sharing community but a real participant in its creation.  There is 
an important difference between a child who lives in a house owned by his 
parents and a child that actually lives with them and contributes to the for-
mation of a home. 
To illustrate the difficulties, think of New York eviction law.  In New 
York, a licensee can be evicted through a summary proceeding in a swift 
procedure after a ten-day notice.145  This rule presumably applies to adult 
                                                          
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Thomas Leopold, The Legacy of Leaving Home: Long-Term Effects of Co-residence on 
Parent-Child Relationships, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 399 (2012). 
 145.  N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 713(7) (2010). 
  
154 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:127 
children who pay no rent or board and cannot be considered tenants.  How-
ever, a group of cases gradually developed a family exception.  When the 
occupant has shared a home with the owner and was a member of her fami-
ly, she cannot be characterized as merely a licensee.  In Sirota v. Sirota, two 
adult children lived with their parents all of their lives.  After the father 
moved out, they stayed in the home and cared for their mother.146  Upon her 
death, the father sought to evict his children as mere licensees, but the court 
refused, requiring him to bring an ejectment action.  This case and others 
underscore that sharing a home with family is a deeper and more permanent 
commitment than one based on mere convenience.147  Even in the absence 
of a clear rule and theoretical support, these seemingly procedural cases 
recognize the fallacy of treating people who have shared a home together as 
having no legal commitment to one another. 
Now, let us assume instead that the mother in Sirota miraculously re-
covers and asks her children to move out immediately.  This unilateral deci-
sion fails to account for the children’s interest in the home.  It does not al-
low them to explain their position, nor does it give them an opportunity to 
address the mother’s concerns.  In addition, treating the children as mere 
licensees and subject to eviction on ten-day’s notice is to disregard their 
contribution to the home and the community in it.  A more nuanced charac-
terization of their interest is required.  Note, however, that the fact that the 
children took care of their mother is not the foundation of their interest.  It 
only goes to show that the relationship was not one-sided.  In order to estab-
lish a home-sharing community, there can be no systematic exploitation of 
either of the parties. 
This Article’s specific test-case of boomerang children represents a 
challenge to common perceptions of the family.  The law typically does not 
recognize familial obligations between independent adults that are not 
bounded by marriage or a marriage-like relationship.  Therefore, when a 
parent allows her adult child to live in her home, it is a matter of her benev-
olence and can be revoked at any given time.  Moreover, parents often wish 
to encourage their children to become independent and self-sufficient.148  
Leaving the parental home is associated with both emotional and physical 
maturity.149  Boomerang children and late home leavers are usually per-
ceived as immature and infantile.  Yet, this judgment already assumes a par-
ticular residential pattern that centers on the nuclear family.  Encouraging 
children to leave the parental home is a culture specific phenomenon, rele-
vant mostly to white, middleclass families.  Among certain racial and ethnic 
                                                          
 146.  626 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673 (1995). 
 147.  See, e.g., Kakwani v. Kakwani, 967 N.Y.S.2d 827 (2013). 
 148.  Cf. Gaia Bernstein & Zvi H. Triger, Over Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221 (2011) 
(addressing claims regarding over parenting). 
 149.  Sassler et al., supra note 124, at 670. 
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groups, multigenerational co-residence is common.150  Moreover, as socio-
logical research has shown, the multigenerational family, including the rela-
tionships between adult children and their parents, is increasingly important 
in everyday life.151  These recent trends may reflect a gradual shift in family 
structure and dynamics.  The concept of home-sharing allows us to 
acknowledge obligations between individuals even when they are not for-
mally perceived as a family.  I now turn to developing the argument and 
explaining its normative implications. 
A.  The Argument: Entrance and Exit 
A community of property is often defined along two central lines: the 
rules of entering the community and rules of exit.152  Entrance rules raise 
the question of whether an adult child who left home, and is interested in 
returning home because of economic or emotional hardship, may do so 
even without his parents’ consent.  Because at this particular point a home-
sharing community has yet to be formed, I would suggest that there is no 
legal obligation to let an adult child into a home.  Other principles of family 
law may justify such an obligation, but sharing a home is not one of them.  
Entrance to a home-sharing community should remain at the discretion of 
its already existing members; people should be allowed to decide whether 
they want to allow their child, parent, or any other person to live with them. 
Adult children who have always lived with their parents present a 
more complex case.  It is hard to pinpoint a clear date that marks the en-
trance to a home-sharing community.  As long as the child is a minor, legal 
rules and social conventions encourage parents to share their home with the 
child.153  These conventions change, however, when the child matures.  Yet 
it would be artificial to consider an eighteenth birthday as an entrance con-
dition to a new community based on the will of the parties.  Instead, we 
have a quasi-entrance rule.154 
This brings us to exit rules. The legal analysis of relations in the home 
relies almost entirely on formal property rights.  I argue that when a home-
sharing community is already formed, mutual obligations arise.  My argu-
ment is not that the adult child is attached to the physical structure of the 
home as an expression of his personality,155 or as a symbol of roots or con-
                                                          
 150.  Farber, supra note 2, at 65.  
 151.  See text accompanying notes 114–118. 
 152.  See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 66. 
 153.  ALICE S. ROSSI & PETER H. ROSSI, OF HUMAN BONDING: THE PARENT CHILD 
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tinuity.156  Unlike prior conceptualizations of the home, this Article stresses 
its sharing aspect: the composition of intimate physical spatiality and close 
human interactions.  Involuntary loss of a home-sharing community injures 
the adult child, not only because he or she has lost a physical shelter, but 
also because of the loss of the relationship and safety net it affords.  The 
parents and the child may continue to have a warm relationship, but she or 
he is no longer part of their home, of their “live-in family”; they no longer 
share their lives together, with their habits, emotions, and actions.  She or 
he is no longer part of the parents’ everyday life, their interactions, even 
their conflicts.  Living with someone represents a unique form of connec-
tion, and the loss of the home is coupled with the loss of this relationship 
and the acceptance and support it offers. 
Acknowledging all the parties to a home-sharing relationship does not 
necessarily mean enforcing cohabitation when the parties (or some of them) 
do not want to live together anymore.  Instead, I argue that the voice of the 
child cannot be ignored when the home-sharing community ends.  Ac-
knowledging voice can be done in a number of ways, including imposing a 
duty to explain and justify the decision, or to listen to the child’s arguments, 
and the setting of cooling-off periods.  Openly discussed understandings are 
important because they allow the parties to contract out of the suggested 
rule (whether formally or informally).  The discussions that precede such 
understanding are also a manifestation of the child’s voice.  One may won-
der, however, why an exit rule requires parties to contract out of a home-
sharing community rather than contract into the community.  This is a pen-
alty rule,157 or, to be exact, what I call a “deliberative accountability 
rule.”158  The rule changes the way parties understand their relationship in 
the home and encourages them to share their expectations of the communi-
ty.  It fosters dialogue and mutual consideration in shaping legal obliga-
tions.  Moreover, it provides an incentive for the stronger party, the owner, 
to inform other cohabitees of her intentions and views.  As the owner cur-
rently controls both the entrance to and exit from the community, the pro-
posed penalty rule will encourage the owner to reveal her preferences re-
garding the community in the home. 
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 157.  In contract law, penalty rules are purposely set at what the parties would not want in or-
der to encourage them to reveal information to each other.  See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Fill-
ing Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 
(1989). 
 158.  In earlier work I suggest the concept of “deliberative accountability rules” (“DAR”) to 
describe intent-defeating rules whose purpose is to foster accountability in family property (giving 
of reasons, allowing a voice, consideration of other options and so on).  In addition, deliberative 
accountability rules are relational and acknowledge parties that are not normally considered part 
of the bargaining process.  Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Deliberative Accountability Rules in Inheritance 
Law: Promoting Accountable Estate Planning, 45 MICH. J. L. REFORM 937 (2012). 
  
2014] BOOMERANG CHILDREN 157 
Recognizing the voice of the child, a non-owner resident, will alter the 
way the parties understand their interaction and the way they negotiate 
around the interaction and agreed upon rules while still living together.  
Even when litigation is not involved, recognizing the voice of the child will 
affect the way children and parents think about their cohabitation.  Relying 
on the expressive function of the law,159 voice-inducing exit rules will 
change the way the parties negotiate even when the conflict is resolved am-
icably.  Parents will begin to consider their children’s position and discuss 
their mutual expectations and concerns from a non-unilateral position. 
Nonetheless, home-sharing for adult children is typically temporary.  
The general social expectation is still that the child will eventually leave the 
nest and start her own home. Yet, associating leaving the parental home 
with maturity and independence is definitely culture specific.  In some mi-
nority communities intergenerational home-sharing is a norm.160  However, 
for the sake of argument let us accept the general social expectation that the 
child will eventually leave the nest and start her own home.  One could ar-
gue that because the living arrangement is essentially temporary, it bears a 
resemblance to the college students in Glassboro and thus does not truly 
represent a home-sharing community.161  However, there are significant dif-
ferences between college roommates and adult children living with their 
parents.  Parents and children typically enjoy a strong emotional bond and 
have lived together for considerable amounts of time in the past.  The 
commitment to the relationship and the community in the home are thus 
stronger.  Both parents and children think of their relationship as a long-
term attachment and are willing to invest time and emotional resources in 
the living arrangement.  Home-sharing in itself is an investment in the long-
term effects of the relationship.162  In most cases, we will be able to find 
joint activities and other-regarding behavior. 
But what if it is the child who wants to leave home and the parents 
who object?  Perhaps they rely on the child’s board payments or value her 
company.  Should this type of exit be treated any differently?  Should the 
law protect the parents in this case?  My answer is a definite “no.”  Forcing 
a person to stay in a dwelling she does not consider home is a severe viola-
tion of her autonomy.  To the extent that the home stands for personality or 
spatial identity, roots and continuity, as previous scholarship has so vigor-
ously argued,163 then chaining a person to a home could be devastating. 
                                                          
 159.  Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 
(1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 910 (1996).  
For a philosophical theory, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of 
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000). 
 160.  See Farber, supra note 2, at 65. 
 161.  See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 162.  See Leopold, supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 163.  See Fox, supra note 57, at 590. 
  
158 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:127 
From the standpoint of the person who wants to exit a home-sharing 
community, it is a question of degree and intensity.  Forcing a person to al-
low her child to live with her violates autonomy to a lesser extent (though 
in these cases, a consideration of autonomy will lead to remedies of voice 
and not enforcement of the community) than forcing her to live in a particu-
lar home with particular people.  In the latter case, the coercion not only in-
cludes the choice of cohabitants, but additionally ties the person to a physi-
cal space.  From the standpoint of the person who wants to preserve a 
home-sharing community, it is also a matter of degree.  When she is forced 
to leave her home she loses both the physical spatiality and the relationship 
in it.  When the child leaves the home, the physical dwelling remains the 
parents’ home.  A parent therefore has a better starting point to recreate her 
home.  Furthermore, because a home often contains more than two people, 
the person who stays in the home still has a home-sharing community.  The 
community may go through a change, but there is a good foundation on 
which it can be restored.  On the other hand, when a child is forced to move 
out, she exits the community and has to build her home anew. 
B.  Categories of Parents and Adult Children Cohabitation 
I turn now to examining three categories of cohabitation by parents 
and children and to reviewing the applicable legal rules for each category: 
the child who provides exceptional care for her parents in exchange for liv-
ing in the home, the child that maintains a good relationship with her par-
ents, and the deadbeat child. 
The first category includes a child that lives with and looks after a par-
ent who needs assistance.  The child cares for the parent and believes she 
will have a place to live so long as she continues to provide care.  At some 
point, however, the parent asks her to move out.  This category is character-
ized by a high level of reciprocity.  An implied contract might even be held 
to exist.  The agreement is not formal, but the expectation of the daughter 
appears justified.164  Informal sources of property rights, such as estoppels 
and irrevocable license, therefore come into play. 
Let me clarify with an example.  In Griffiths v. Williams,165 an English 
case, a daughter lived in her mother’s home for most of her life.  Her moth-
er always professed her intention of leaving her daughter a life interest in 
the house.  The daughter looked after her mother in her later years and spent 
money on repairs and improvements to the house.  She did so because she 
believed she would be able to live in the house for the rest of her life.  
However, the mother wrote a will and left the house to her granddaughter, 
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without securing a life interest for her daughter as promised.  The English 
court held that the doctrine of estoppel applied.166  According to this doc-
trine, if A intends that B will act in reliance on a promise to his or her det-
riment, and B indeed does so, then A will be prevented from asserting his or 
her own strict and formal legal rights.  The court considered the care and 
improvements provided by the daughter to be acts made in reliance on her 
mother’s promise.  It determined that the mother had repeatedly assured her 
daughter that she would be allowed to live in the home.  Because the prom-
ise was direct and explicit, it was easy to arrive at this conclusion.  Yet at 
times such promises are much more latent and implied, and infrequently 
discussed.167  Therefore, most resident children will have a harder time es-
tablishing a promise and reliance in such cases.168 
According to American property law, and returning to our hypothet-
ical, the daughter lived with her mother based on her mother’s permission, 
so she had a license to stay there.  A license is typically revocable.  Howev-
er, a license can become irrevocable under the rules of estoppel.169  An ir-
revocable license is treated as an easement in the Restatement.170  Accord-
ing to the Restatement, estoppel is a flexible rule, the purpose of which is to 
avoid injustice when a user of land substantially changed her position be-
lieving that the permission would not be revoked.171  Unlike the English 
rule, the Restatement recognizes both implied and express representa-
tions.172  Yet such cases typically are concerned with servitude by estoppel 
and not with permission to live on the land with the owner.  Most common-
ly, these cases involve a representation by a seller or developer regarding 
the seller’s neighboring land or representations by neighbors,173 or include 
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boundary disputes, land transfer disputes, and landlord-tenant law.174  Even 
though I did not encounter any case that involved home-sharing in return 
for care, the doctrine of estoppel is flexible enough to account for implied 
representation in these types of cases.  As Stewart Sterk explains, courts 
consider the context of particular ongoing relationships:175 
 The case law also reveals a second use of the estoppel doctrine.  
Even when the parties have made no promise at all, a number of 
courts hold that within the context of particular ongoing relation-
ships, one party may have a duty to rescue the other from fore-
seeable harm caused by the other party’s mistaken understanding 
of the parties’ respective legal rights.  Both the existence and the 
scope of this duty remain controversial in current doctrine, but 
within the relationship between neighbors, and between landlord 
and tenant, many courts are not willing to treat the parties as if 
they were strangers dealing with each other at arm’s length, re-
sponsible only for obligations expressly undertaken.176 
There are a number of available remedies in the case of servitude by an 
estoppel, and there is a great amount of flexibility to account for the particu-
lar circumstances of the case.177  Although this broad position is certainly 
controversial,178 Anglo-American law appears to have the tools to address 
the first category of home-sharing by parents and adult children. 
The second category is more challenging to contemporary legal prac-
tice.  The daughter—let’s call her Sally—in this example is a student who 
lives with her mother, Pam.  They maintain a close and affectionate rela-
tionship, share chores, spend time together, and provide emotional or eco-
nomic support to each other when needed.  Sally understands she will be 
able to live at home until she graduates and finds a job, but after a small ar-
gument the mother demands that she move out.  Sally is living at home be-
cause her mother has allowed her to do so.  She is therefore formally a li-
censee.  Unless the license proves to be irrevocable, the mother can evict 
her child at will.  As we have seen in our discussion of the previous catego-
ry, for the license to become irrevocable, Sally would have to show that she 
changed her position believing that the license would not be revoked.179  A 
change in position may be indicated by investing resources in improving the 
house or providing care.  These actions have to convince a court that Sally 
acted to her detriment based on an express or implied promise. 
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In the typical case of a boomerang child living with his or her parents, 
that is usually not the case.  Although the parties may have an implied or 
express agreement, in most cases it will be hard to establish a change in po-
sition.  Unless the child had alternative living arrangements or job opportu-
nities that she or he rejected because of the agreement, current law does not 
recognize the child’s claim. 
This category profoundly challenges conventional analysis of property 
rights in the home.  I argue that current legal practice is misguided.  The 
home-sharing community is the theoretical basis for the argument.  Sally 
and Pam created a home together.  Their home is not just the physical struc-
ture of the house, but also the relationships, atmosphere, and behavior in the 
home.  In the home, Sally and Pam make decisions together and enjoy both 
privacy and cooperation.  It is their intimate and communal spatiality.  
Home-sharing contributes to the autonomy of both parties, at its best 
providing security and acceptance, solidarity, and growth to both mother 
and daughter.  It creates a close and immediate community that supports the 
individuals’ need for shelter and repose, and their relational needs. 
If indeed we are convinced that the cohabitation has turned into a 
home-sharing community, then, I argue, the daughter deserves some legal 
protection based on the doctrines of irrevocable license or estoppel.  As 
Sterk explains, courts are not willing to treat certain types of relations as 
strangers, even when the facts do not reveal a promise.180  Even though the 
argument is definitely controversial under current law, I suggest that the 
context of an ongoing relationship allows for a remedy in these cases.  The 
property community serves as the relevant context of the relationship.181 
Indeed, there is evidence that the law does not consider residents with 
no formal right in the home as mere licensees if they are family members of 
the right holder.  Remember New York eviction law, the law which deter-
mines that a licensee can be evicted through a summary proceeding in a 
swift procedure after a ten-day notice.182  Case law reveals that courts are 
reluctant to evict a family member in a summary proceeding, and instead 
direct the owner to bring an ejectment action in the appropriate court.183  A 
recent court decision explains that “where the occupancy of the subject 
premises arises out of the familial relationship, such as an adult child who 
has lived in the family home since birth, a summary proceeding may not be 
maintained,”184 and that “it can not be disputed that a true family relation-
ship, which includes a shared home, involves a far deeper and more perma-
nent commitment than one based upon mere ‘convenience, curiosity, or [en-
                                                          
 180.  See Sterk, supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 181.  See supra text accompanying note 173. 
 182.  N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 713(7) (2010). 
 183.  Kakwani v. Kakwani, 967 N.Y.S.2d 827 (2013). 
 184.  Id. at 833. 
  
162 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:127 
tertainment].’”185  Although this family exception was originally crafted by 
the courts to protect a spouse or cohabitant, it has been expanded to include 
minor stepchildren,186 adult children,187 and grandchildren.188  These cases 
all included shared living by the owner (or one of the owners) with the fam-
ily member-licensee. 
This procedural protection is an important step toward the recognition 
of home-sharing, but it is hardly enough.  It does not rethink the right to 
evict the relative, but merely requires the eviction to be effected through a 
longer, more formal procedure.  A systematic analysis of the benefits and 
harms of home-sharing should lie at the basis of providing remedies in 
these cases. 
The third category includes the deadbeat daughter.  Sally is unem-
ployed, does little to contribute to the household, and is entirely supported 
by her mother.  Sally and Pam regularly get into arguments over small 
chores around the house.  The deadbeat child is the fear of every parent.  In 
the case of a deadbeat child, it is unclear whether a home-sharing communi-
ty was ever formed.  A home-sharing community requires that all the par-
ties contribute to the community and invest emotionally, physically, or eco-
nomically in the home.  Contribution is important for community not as a 
substitute for intent, or as part of a quid pro quo principle, but rather be-
cause it prevents the fear of exploitation.  If one of the parties is systemati-
cally exploited, then the foundation of sharing is damaged.  The concept of 
a home-sharing community cannot support a child that takes advantage of 
the parent.  A community must be important to all the parties.  I therefore 
argue that the child should not have any legal claim against the parent. 
In the next Section, I discuss the complex issue of remedies.  In short, 
I believe it is important to have a set of protections aimed at recognizing the 
voice of the child.  Instead of thinking of the owner as the sole deci-
sionmaker, and of the child as having no influence on the process, the law 
should recognize the child’s right to be heard and the mother’s duty to justi-
fy her choice, and in certain cases it should establish a cooling-off period. 
C.  Remedies 
This Article promotes a conceptual change.  The aim is to change the 
power relations in the home and thus limit the owner’s power to exclude.  It 
offers an alternative vision of the home that highlights sharing as a signifi-
cant component of living with others.  This Part lays out suggestions for a 
new set of remedies that acknowledge home-sharing.  It preserves a certain 
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level of generality and does not go into the particulars of the rules.  The 
purpose is to explain how an eviction process should treat people who lived 
with the owner differently than other licensees when a home-sharing com-
munity has developed. 
Rashmi Dyal-Chand claims that outcomes in property disputes have 
the potential to promote sharing of a resource.189  Instead of outcomes that 
support ownership and exclusion, more sophisticated outcomes will 
acknowledge competing claims over the resource.  Similarly, the purpose of 
remedies in home-sharing disputes is not to enforce a strict outcome of ei-
ther exclusion or continued forced cohabitation.  Continued cohabitation 
forces the parties to live under the same roof even after the relationship has 
turned sour.  Unlike larger communities that spread over a wide geograph-
ical space, a home-sharing community is close and tight, and there is no real 
refuge from it because it is confined to one’s most intimate place.  In addi-
tion, continued cohabitation raises the concern that formal right-holders will 
refrain from investing in the home-sharing community because the commu-
nity may give rise to a legal claim.190  I therefore conclude that this remedy 
will be mostly inappropriate for home-sharing communities. 
Exclusion of the child’s claim is also objectionable because it fails to 
recognize the child’s contribution to the creation of the home and her be-
longingness to the community.  It focuses solely on formal property rights.  
A desired outcome should consider the different position of each party, the 
parent-owner and child-occupant, and their relationship within the home. 
In addition, the New York judicial rule of familial exception is not an 
appropriate remedy either.  Although this rule rightly insists on redefining 
the status of people that create a home-sharing community with the owner 
of the property, it has two deficiencies.  First, it relies on the familial rela-
tion rather than on sharing a home.  Second, it is purely procedural and 
makes no substantive recognition of a home-sharing community. 
The suggested remedy concerns the voice of the child when the com-
munity ends.  A remedy that targets the voice of the licensee would restruc-
ture the relationship and limit hasty decisions by owners.  Giving voice to 
the child might include a cooling-off period, and an obligation to justify a 
decision and listen to the child’s position.  In Frambach v. Dunihue, the 
owners ordered Dunihue to leave home within thirty minutes.191  This type 
of exit decision is unacceptable; it does not respect the co-resident.192  Un-
der the proposed remedy framework, the Frambachs would need to explain 
their request, justify the case, and listen to what Dunihue has to say. 
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Aside from the benefits of procedural protection, a remedy of voice 
has an important ex ante function.  Because parties can contract out of these 
rules, the rules serve as penalties.  The rules provide an incentive for the 
stronger party, the owner, to inform other cohabitees of her intentions and 
views regarding cohabitation.  The parties are encouraged to engage in a di-
alogue about their intentions and expectations in sharing a home: how, 
when, and under what conditions should their community end.  Moreover, 
these rules encourage the owner to communicate information to a party that 
conventional analysis does not even consider part of the bargaining process.  
The adult-child-licensee’s interest in the home is then being incorporated 
into the decision-making process.  Rather than having one party—the own-
er—making a unilateral decision, the rules create a bifocal bargaining pro-
cess.193 
Putting these concepts in practice, when parents ask their child to 
move out and the child refuses, an eviction lawsuit will be filed.  Before the 
court approves the eviction, in the event the parties did not contract out of 
these remedies, the court must be convinced that the requirements of voice 
(justification and discussion) have been met.  Alternatively, the court can 
refer the case to a mediation process that will ensure the parties have a 
chance to communicate.194  Finally, the court can order a cooling-off period. 
A cooling-off period of a few months to a year will allow the licensee 
to come to terms with the loss of his home community and take important 
steps in constructing an alternative home.  The concept of home-sharing re-
quires, in principle, that not every set of facts merits a cooling-off period.  
The deadbeat child, for example, is not entitled to such protection.  Howev-
er, in order to avoid litigation costs and enforcement inefficiencies, I sug-
gest the enactment of a clear rule.  Whenever a child has lived with her par-
ents, the parents must notify the child of their intent to revoke permission to 
live in the home a few months in advance.  The law should determine the 
exact amount of time and courts will have limited discretion to provide 
shorter or longer periods in extreme circumstances. 
These remedies also have their limitations.  One could argue that, 
much like in the case of continued cohabitation, homeowners will dread a 
cooling-off period and hence either refuse to let their child into their home 
or choose to invest as little as possible in the relationship to avoid the defi-
nition of a home-sharing community.  The risk of tension, conflict, and an-
imosity is disturbing from an ex post perspective as well. 
Let us consider the parent’s options when a child asks to move in with 
her.  If the parent is concerned with the legal ramifications of the joint liv-
ing arrangement, she has three options: she can refuse the child’s request, 
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open her home to the child but contract out of the remedies proposed here, 
or let the child in but deliberately minimize sharing in the home.  Because 
the parent can opt out explicitly, this is the easier and less costly course of 
action.  Yet, even if the parent prefers to avoid this type of conversation, 
choosing one of the two other options does not undermine the argument.  I 
am not arguing that cohabitation of adult children and their parents is a 
good in and of itself, but rather that owners should live up to the responsi-
bilities they create in establishing a home-sharing community.  Owners 
have to be responsible for misrepresentations towards their cohabitees, but 
at the same time they can clearly avoid these types of commitments. 
Of course, parties that can amicably resolve conflicts do not need the 
help of the law.  Yet the law shapes the perception of these parties regard-
ing their mutual obligations and guides the way they act and resolve their 
differences.195  The parties’ understandings, expectations, and behaviors 
will be different under a regime that recognizes home-sharing commit-
ments. 
What about damages?  Damages could prompt people to internalize 
the cost of exit from the community.  If right-holders were required to pay 
for the revocation of a license, they would have to evaluate whether the 
benefit from ending the home-sharing community outweighs the cost of 
damages.  There are, however, a few problems with this remedy as well.  
First, the possibility of compensation may encourage the child to claim she 
does not wish to leave home, even if the move is ultimately desired.  An 
additional problem concerns the larger familial picture, including brothers 
or sisters of the boomerang child.  Suppose the homeowners have three 
children, only one of whom lives with them as an adult child.  If the co-
resident child receives compensation, she will gain more property than her 
siblings.  If parents have a certain amount of property that they intend to 
pass on to their children, compensating the live-in child violates the princi-
ple of equal distribution.196  However, parties are free to opt for the remedy 
of damages when they find it to be the best means for resolving cohabita-
tion related disagreements. 
VI.  HOME-SHARING: CHALLENGES AND OBJECTIONS 
Both the concept of home-sharing and the particulars of some of the 
suggestions presented in this Article challenge current perceptions of prop-
erty and family.  The autonomy of the homeowner is jeopardized because 
she can no longer freely decide to revoke permission to live in her home.  
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Since home is such an important metaphor of privacy and autonomy in 
American law,197 such a limitation strikes at the core of individuality: the 
shaping of one’s home environment. 
The concept of home-sharing does recognize autonomy, but at the 
same time accepts that autonomy is entangled with sharing in the home.  A 
homeowner can choose freely whether or not to let another person into her 
home.  This choice reflects her autonomy and may be influenced by sheer 
will or a sense of commitment.  My argument is that once an owner has de-
cided to enter a home-sharing community and to embrace the responsibility 
and other-regarding attitude and behavior it entails, there is a particular way 
to exit.  Sharing a home reflects the autonomy and voice of each cohabitant, 
but also the respect for and consideration of others.  Exit should also reflect 
such respect for the voice of the licensee. 
Obviously, a community may develop in a way that the owner did not 
foresee, and she may wish to change her home environment.  This dynamic 
aspect of autonomy is definitely important.  Yet, the remedy itself will most 
often not enforce the continuation of home-sharing, just a temporary cool-
ing-off period. 
This issue brings me to the more critical objection to the concept of 
home-sharing: the conflation of home and family.  Laura Rosenbury has ar-
gued that the home is still the organizing structure for family, and this focus 
leaves out other meaningful relationships that provide care outside the 
home and are not based on dependency.198  Positioning the home at center 
stage is the result, according to the argument, of a patriarchal model.  This 
objection envisions the home as a site for conjugal relationships along with 
their minor children.  Yet the home hosts other meaningful relationships, 
and intergenerational relationships are just one example.  Relations between 
siblings199 and nontraditional households200 are others.  Rosenbury criticizes 
the distinction between marriage-like relationships and non-cohabiting 
friends, but devotes less attention to other forms of cohabitation, in particu-
lar intergenerational ties.  Rather than criticize the dominance of the home 
metaphor in property and family law, this Article has explored its hidden 
meanings and the ways power relations in the home are construed in the 
less familiar territory of co-residence by adult children and parents. 
If the purpose of this exploration is to consider various forms of home-
sharing communities, then the identity of the licensee becomes important.  
Is there a difference between a child and a stepchild, between adult children 
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and elderly parents?  Does the argument distinguish between family mem-
bers and non-familial relations?  Paid in-home caregivers demonstrate this 
challenge: are they part of a home-sharing community?  A home-sharing 
community is not dependent on the particular identity of the cohabitants.  It 
is wide enough to allow freedom of association and family life.  The im-
portant question is whether a home-sharing community exists according to 
the criteria presented above.201  Nonetheless, when we examine whether a 
home-sharing community has been formed, the implied understandings of 
the parties are significant.  If the parties think of the living arrangement as 
temporary, of the commitment as contingent, their willingness to invest in 
the community decreases.  Most often, paid caregivers and their care re-
ceivers understand the cohabitation as temporary.  Yet, even in the face of 
presumptions of fact, exceptions have to be made where a home-sharing 
community has been established. 
A related concern pertains to the fragile texture of family life.  One 
could argue that the law should not interfere with familial relations in the 
home.  Encouraging family members to make legal agreements or enforcing 
remedies when cohabitation ends will disrupt the more amicable ways in 
which families can resolve differences.  The problem with this argument is 
that the law already intervenes with familial relations in the home.  It gives 
the owner, the parent in this case, the power to end the relationship unilater-
ally.202  A related concern is that familial and familial-like relationships are 
susceptible to courts’ normative judgment regarding appropriate behaviors, 
which in turn leads to the standardization of the family.  However, the ar-
gument does not probe into relationships but rather makes people aware of 
their obligation when they enter and exit the home-sharing community.  It 
only controls the exit points by prescribing a clear rule and minimal judicial 
interference.  Moreover, parties can contract out of these rules and self-
regulate their mutual commitments by engaging in a dialogue. 
A final objection claims this Article does not go far enough.  If one 
were truly to challenge formal sources of property rights, then the licensee 
would have rights in the home based on the community.  This type of objec-
tion resembles the case of community property between spouses or unmar-
ried couples.  Yet, there is an important difference between a home and a 
house.  The home refers to the symbolic spatiality that includes the commu-
nity of people who live together.  The house represents the property itself. 
Because a home-sharing community concerns the living arrangement and 
not the economic value of the asset, awarding an undivided share of the 
property should be limited to cases where parties also pooled financial re-
                                                          
 201.  See supra Part III. 
 202.  See Frances Olsen’s famous argument regarding the separation of the family and the 
market: Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
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sources.  Only in cases where the sharing includes a joint economic effort 
can such measures be considered.  Home-sharing, then, still bows to the 
power of the formal owners, but reconstructs the responsibilities existing 
between co-residents. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the meaning of sharing a home on two lev-
els.  I first discussed the more abstract qualities of a home-sharing commu-
nity, its benefits and its perils.  This analysis can serve as a foundation for 
future discussion of other forms cohabitation: elderly parents living with 
their children, owners living with paid caretakers, and non-conjugal part-
nerships.  The second level dealt specifically with home-sharing by adult 
children and parents.  Other categories of cohabitation are different in their 
application, empirical data, advantages, and pitfalls.  For example, elderly 
parents that live in their children’s home require larger discussions of inter-
generational reciprocity, dependence, and commitment. 
As this Article has suggested, the legal arrangements must be nuanced.  
At the end of the day, the thrust of this Article has been to convince readers 
that the way we think of co-residence today is misguided.  Alongside own-
ership, we need to recognize the communal project in a unique location, the 
home. 
